20 September 1960

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
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CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN






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SPECIAL ITEM



On the basis of findings of a Special Watch Committee Meeting, convened at 2300Z, 19 September 1960, concerning specific unusual developments within and by the Sino-Soviet Bloc, the United States Intelligence Board concludes that while some of these developments were considered unusual when compared with the day-to-day normal activity, the Soviet Union is not preparing to initiate hostilities in the immediate future.

The unusual number of Sovimerchant ships in or arriving few days, including one Sovimerchant ships, and seven We to the Bloc, two of these US. The presence of Bloc leader The probability of an imminate attempt by the USSR.	ing at US ports in the neviet ship, the Baltika, the stern ships under chart in registry. rs at the UN.	ext hree ter
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

20 September 1960

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

II. ASIA-AFRICA

South Vietnam: Communist guerrillas in South Vietnam reportedly have been ordered to intensify their terrorist and sabotage activities in connection with the 15th anniversary on 23 September of the anti-French resistance movement in Indochina. The prime target is said to be Saigon, although stepped-up attacks on military posts and patrols in the countryside are also planned.	K
Communist groups may attempt to plant explosives in places frequented by Americans, and has advised against any night driving in Saigon from 21 to 24 September. (Page 1)	
III. THE WEST	K
Ecuador: President Velasco Ibarra has publicly repudiated the Rio Protocol of 1942 providing for settlement of Ecuador's border dispute with Peru. a "formal denunciation will be made later." The border dispute has longbeen an emotion-nacked issue in	lete
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mal denunciation will be made later."	i
The border dispute has long been an emotion-packed issue in	Į.
both Ecuador and Peru, and on a number of occasions in recent years hostilities have been threatened. The Peruvian foreign minister on 17 September stated Peru is prepared to repulse	
any invasion attempt. Further policy modifications by the new	
Velasco administration, inaugurated on 1 September, are sug-	
gested by the appointment of a pro-Castro demagogue to a key	
cabinet post and open expressions of willingness to expand trade	
with the Soviet bloc. (Page 2) (Map)	

i.

LATE ITEMS

(*Laos: The Pathet Lao high command has ordered its units
to stop fighting in those provincesincluding Sam Neuawhich
are "under the control of the government of Souvanna Phouma."
In choosing to consider Sam Neua loyal to Souvanna despite in-
dications that military commanders there are loyal to General
Phoumi, the Pathet Lao leadership may have been motivated by
concern that additional military pressure at this time might
serve to reunify the badly divided Lao army. The order calling
for a cease fire left numerous loopholes in case the Pathet Lao
should decide to resume the offensive in Sam Neua. The insurgents'
propaganda activities in the province will be facilitiated by the
withdrawal of army troops from outlying posts to form a small
defense perimeter around Sam Neua town. Premier Souvanna's
cancellation of a planned cabinet meeting in Luang Prabang with
the king on 19 September may have been influenced by an announce-
ment over Phoumi's Radio Savannakhet that its "liberating forces"
were launching an assault on Vientiane.
an attack
by one of Phoumi's units is imminent.
*Congo: UAR President Nasir,
, called for "decisive action"
by Ghana, Guinea, and the UAR in support of Lumumba, whose
frantic efforts to retain power in Leopoldville continue. Nasir
proposed that the three states concentrate their forces in Leopold-
ville and use them to put pressure on "all parties and the UN" to
retain Kasavubu as President and Lumumba as premier.
Nasir's chief representative in
the Congoin concert with the representatives of other African
states including Morocco's General Kettani, who appears to be
principal adviser to the army chief, Colonel Mobutuhas been
working feverishly since 16 September to persuade Kasavubu and
his supporters to accept a reconciliation with Lumumba.

Press reports on 19 September pointed toward a possible early announcement of some compromise arrangement; a Kasavubu spokesman publicly acknowledged that peace talks were in progress and indicated that the Ileo government recently named by Kasavubu was

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DAILY BRIEF

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considering a "cabinet post" for Lumumba. Later Lumumba's representative at the UN claimed an agreement had been reached under which Lumumba would remain "chief of the legal government."

The special session of the UN General Assembly on the Congo situation closed early on 20 September when the USSR abandoned its efforts to obtain censure of Hammarskjold's actions in the Congo. This paved the way for the overwhelming endorsement by the assembly of the Asian-African resolution backing the secretary general and opposing military aid to the Congo except through UN channels.

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
DAILY BRIEF

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Possible Communist Violence in Saigon

	Communist guerrilla units in South Vietnam have reportedly been ordered to intensify terrorism and sabotage in connection with the 15th anniversary on 23 September of the beginning of armed resistance against French colonial rule.
	primary focus of such activity will be in Saigon, although the Communists are also expected to step up attacks against military posts and patrols of regular Vietnamese army troops as well as civil guard and self-defense forces in the countryside.
And the second of the second o	Special action groups are believed to have been infiltrated into the capital with the aim of committing acts of sabotage against key installations, including Tan Son Nhut airport. gasoline depots, and bridges.
and the state of t	believes that attempts may be made to plant explosives in places frequented by Americans and has advised against night driving in Saigon during the period 21-24 September.
- Company of the Comp	The upsurge of Communist guerrilla activity during the past nine months has affected provinces in the Mekong delta area south and west of Saigon and main routes leading from Saigon, but the capital city itself has previously been considered secure. There has been renewed emphasis by the Communist regime in North Vietnam on the "struggle against the US-Diem clique" in the South, and plans to create incidents in Saigon may be partly intended to stir up further discontent among non-Communist opponents of the Diem administration in Saigon.

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New Ecuadorean Regime Suggests Foreign Policy Changes

President Velasco Ibarra has publicly repudiated the Rio Protocol of 1942 which provided for settlement of Ecuador's border dispute with Peru but has never been fully implemented. a "formal denunciation will be made later." The border dispute has long been an emotion-packed issue in both Ecuador and Peru, and has nearly caused hostilities on a number of occasions in recent years. The Peruvian foreign minister stated on 17 September that Peru is prepared to repel any invasion attempt. Velasco was in- augurated as president for the fourth time on 1 September. His
most recent term as president was 1952-56. The possibility of further policy modifications by the new administration is suggested by the appointment of Manuel Araujo, a pro-Castro demagogue, to head the Ministry of Government, and by public expressions of willingness to expand trade with the Soviet bloc. The appointment of Araujo was apparently designed primarily to remove him from his elective post as president of the Chamber of Deputies. Nevertheless he now holds one of the most powerful positions in the Ecuadorean Government and will be in a position to work for changes in Ecuador's generally anti-Castro foreign policy. In his cabinet post, he serves at the pleasure of the president.
President Velasco affirmed an intention to "trade with whoever offers us good conditions" in a public statement on 17 September, in response to press questions about a trip to Czechoslovakia by the minister of education. Czech Minister Kuchvalek, resident in Rio de Janeiro but recently accredited to Quito, reportedly offered a \$10,000,000 loan and expressed willingness to take bananas in exchange for Czech manufactured goods during a visit to Quito from 24 August to 8 September.
-TOP-SECRET

The Congo Situation (as of 0400 EDT)

Representatives in the Congo of several independent
African states notably the UAR, Ghana, Guinea, and
Morocco are engaged in frantic efforts to help Lumumba
retain power in Leopoldville.
UAR President
Nasir urged 'decisive action to save the situation.' He pro-
posed that the UAR, Ghana, and Guinea "with no publicity"
concentrate their forces in Leopoldville and use them to put
pressure on 'all parties and the UN' to maintain the 'legal
situation," which he defined as the recognition of Kasavubu
an Duantidant and Lumumba as promise. Masir also called
as President and Lumumba as premier. Nasir also called
for the formation of a three-member council, composed of the
three states' diplomatic representatives in Leopoldville, which
would "consult and apply political pressure." Most of Ghana's
contingent in the UN force is already stationed in the Leopold-
ville area, while the Guinean battalion and the bulk of the UAR's
troops are presently located in the northern part of Leopold-
ville Province and in mrthern Equateur Province, respectively.
Nasir's
ambassador in the Congo, in concert with representatives of
Ghana, Guinea, and Morocco, has been working feverishly since
16 September to persuade Kasavubu and his supporters to accept
a reconciliation with Lumumba, a course specifically endorsed
by Nasir on that date as "the sole solution."
an attempt to use Army Chief of Staff Mobutu to inter-
vene with Kasavubu. The effort failed, however, when Mobutu
''gave way completely'' to Kasavubu.
On 18 September, nevertheless, Nasir's ambassador reported
that an "agreement" had been reached between Lumumba, Kasavubu,
"the president of parliament, and certain of the deputies."
Lumumba apparently was planning to
move the government, including his cabinet ministers and the
National Assembly, to Stanleyville; he had
agreed with this step provided it was made after the announcement
of the "agreement." The ambassador passed on a request from
Lumumbato whom he was to give a "sum" later that dayfor a

"powerful transmitter" for Stanleyville as well as for other "assistance." Press reports on 19 September pointed toward a possible early announcement of some sort of compromise arrangement.
A Kasavubu spokesman publicly acknowledged that talks between the contending factions were in progress and indicated that the Ileo government recently named by Kasavububut still not formally investedwas considering a "cabinet post" for Lumumba Later Lumumba's representative at the UN claimed knowledge of an agreement under which Lumumba would remain "chief of the legal government."
Mobutu, meanwhile, was reported on 19 September to have survived a second attempt on his life by Lumumba adherents. The American Embassy in Leopoldville has characterized Mobutu, who appears to lean heavily on Moroccan General Kettani, as an honest and dedicated man who is appalled by the magnitude of the Congo's problems. On 18 September he was still talking naively about a "council of students" to run an interim government pending the "transfer" of power to a Kasavubu—Ileo regime by the end of October.
The special session of the UN General Assembly on the Congo situation ended early on 20 September when the USSR suddenly abandoned its efforts to obtain endorsement of its resolution which would in effect have censured Secretary General Hammarskjold's actions in the Congo and upheld the right of unilateral aid to the Congolese Government. The assembly backed overwhelmingly the Asian-African resolution supporting Hammarskjold and opposing any military aid to the Congo except through UN channels. The Congo situation, however, will almost certainly be discussed further during the 15th General Assembly, which opens this afternoon.

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The Vice President

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Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of Commerce

The Secretary of Commerce

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

National Security Agency

The Director

National Indications Center

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